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There can be no doubt that the court must be troubled at
the prospect of having to confirm arbitration awards calling for
specific performance in situations where, had the matter appeared
directly before the court, it might have denied the petition on
traditional discretionary grounds.37 It would seem that the problem
might be considerably relieved by amending Article 84 of the Civil
Practice Act to provide that in any matter before an arbitrator
where he may order specific performance, the execution of which
would involve considerable supervision, the arbiter be a technically
qualified person, fully capable of and responsible for the enforce-
ment of his award; or, in the alternative, that he have full power to
retain such qualified parties to settle disputes which might arise
during the ordered performance. It goes without saying that the
arbiter's award would always be subject to confirmation by the
court. It appears probable that such amendment would relieve the
courts from the possibility of long and onerous supervision, inject a
certain degree of stability into construction litigation, encourage
arbitration in this area, and lastly, remove what is considered in
some quarters to be an assault on the traditional discretionary power
of courts of equity.
CORPORATIONS - BUSINESS CORPORATION HELD PROPER BEN-
EFICIARY OF REAL PROPERTY TRUsT.-Defendant, a business cor-
poration; proposed a liquidation plan calling for the exchange of the
corporate realty for trust certificates to be issued to the stock-
holders by trustees, who were to hold title to the real property,
collect its income, and distribute the net income to the holders of
the trust certificates. Plaintiff, one of three corporate stockholders
of defendant corporation, sought a judgment declaring that the
trust agreement was invalid on the ground that business cor-
porations cannot be beneficiaries of trusts of realty. The Supreme
Court, Special Term, upholding the validity of the trust agreement,
held that a business corporation may be the beneficiary of a real
property trust. Alcon Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207
N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
Prior to the instant case, the law in New York appeared to be
that a business corporation could not be the beneficiary of a real
property trust.1 Although a charitable corporation, by statute, can
37 Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S2d 401 (1st
Dep't 1952).
1 In the Matter of Norton's Estate, 7 Misc. 2d 342, 343, 155 N.Y.S.2d 838,
839 (Surr. Ct. 1956) ; In the Matter of DeForest's Estate, 147 Misc. 82, 86,
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be the beneficiary of any trust,2 a long line of cases exists denying
business corporations the power to receive and hold, as beneficiaries,
trusts of realty.3 The earliest of these was Adamns v. Perry,4 in
which the Court of Appeals held that a corporation had no capacity
to be beneficiary of a trust., The Adams case was followed and
cited in In the Matter of Griffin's Will 6 for the same principle.
Again, in In the Matter of DeForest's Estate,7 Surrogate Foley
flatly stated that a business corporation could not be the beneficiary
of a trust, and this prohibition was reiterated once more in In the
Matter of Norton's Estate.8
The Court in the instant case, therefore, in establishing that a
business corporation could be the beneficiary of a trust of real
property, was faced with a rather formidable array of cases ap-
parently to the contrary. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court
analyzed and distinguished these apparently irreconcilable authorities,
looking at each case in the light of the statutes controlling the area
at the time.
The Adams case is readily distinguishable on the grounds
that it involved an attempted trust of personalty.9 The trust there
was also violative of the rule against perpetuities.'0 Furthermore,
as the present Court points out, at the time of the Adams case a
corporation could not acquire and hold real property or choses in
action."1 In addition, the only statutes extant at the time dealt merely
with a corporation's power to act as trustee and not beneficiary.'
2
In deciding that a corporation had no capacity to be a beneficiary,
the court was ultimately guided by the absence of any statutes
giving this power to a corporation.' 8 In light of the significant
changes in the relevant statutory background since the Adams case,
1 4
including the power of a corporation to acquire and hold real
property and choses in action, the Adams case could hardly be
controlling today.
263 N.Y.Supp. 135, 140 (Surr. Ct. 1933); In the Matter of Griffin's Will,
167 N.Y. 71, 78, 60 N.E. 284, 286 (1901) (concurring opinion) (dictum);
Adams v. Perry, 43 N.Y. 487, 498 (1871).2 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §113(1); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §12(1)
(Tilden Act).
3 See note 1 supra.
4 43 N.Y. 487 (1871).
5 Id. at 498.
6 167 N.Y. 71, 78, 60 N.E. 284, 286 (1901) (concurring opinion) (dictum).
7 147 Misc. 82, 263 N.Y. Supp. 135 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
87 Misc. 2d 342, 343, 155 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839 (Surr. Ct. 1956).9 Adams v. Perry, 43 N.Y. 487, 497 (1871).
,oId. at 498-500.
21 Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207 N.Y.S.2d 137, 141
(Sup. Ct. 1960).22 mIbd.
13Adams v. Perry, 43 N.Y. 487, 498 (1871).
14 See text accompanying footnotes 17-22 infra.
1961 ]
370 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 35
The Griffin case was decided under the same statutory scheme
as the Adams case.' 5  Furthermore, in both cases the respective
trusts were invalid for other reasons. 6 Also, in the Griffin case,
the reference to Adams was by way of dictum in a concurring
opinion.
In 1909, after the Adams and Griffin cases had been decided,
the following statutes were enacted:
(a) Every corporation as such has power, though not specified in the law
under which it is incorporated:
3. To acquire property for the corporate purposes by grant, gift, pur-
chase, devise or bequest .. , 17
(b) The term property includes real and personal property.'S
(c) The term personal property includes chattels, money, things in action.
19
(d) Any stock corporation . . . may purchase, acquire, hold and dispose
of. . . choses in action. ....
(d) The term person includes a corporation. ... 21
As can readily be seen, the first three statutes, when read
together, enable a corporation to hold property as a beneficiary.
The fourth has the same effect, since the interest of a beneficiary
is a chose in action.2 2  It would seem, therefore, that these pro-
visions of the Construction Law and the Corporation Law settle
the issue definitively and provide a ready answer to the problem.
Nevertheless, the courts continued, in two subsequent cases, to
adhere to the holdings of the earlier Adams and Griffin cases. In In
the Matter of DeForest's Estate 23 the Court declared that a
business corporation could not be the beneficiary of a trust of realty.
2 4
The statutory changes which had taken place some twenty-four
years earlier were apparently ignored, although it is highly un-
likely that the court was totally unaware of their existence. A
more probable explanation might be that the court was unaware
of the fact that the statutes did not exist at the time of the Adams
'5 The statutory scheme was not changed until 1909.
'I Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207 N.Y.S2d 137, 141
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
17 N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 14(3).
Is N.Y. GEN. CONsTR. LAW § 38.
19 N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 39.20 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 18.21 N.Y. GEN. CoNsTR. LAW § 37.
22 The right of a beneficiary to enforce the trust is a chose in action.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 100; Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 321, 50 N.E.
967, 968 (1898). Consequently, since a corporation can acquire personal
property, including choses in action, a corporation can be beneficiary of a
trust.
23 147 Misc. 82, 86, 263 N.Y. Supp. 135, 140 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
2 4Ibd.
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and Griffin cases, since both cases were cited with approval as
having a pertinent bearing on the outcome.
Again, in In the Matter of Norton's Estate,25 Surrogate Frank-
enthaler stated that although a trust of personalty would be allowed,
a trust of realty for a business corporation was prohibited.26 The
court here, however, limited the basis of its decision to a construction
of the trust statute, Section 96(3) of the Real Property Law, and
did not find it necessary to investigate the case law or other statutes,
using section 96 as the sole determinant of the issue. It reasoned
that, since only trusts of realty are limited by section 96, trusts of
personalty are not limited, and therefore a trust of personalty may
be created for any lawful purpose, but not a trust of realty.2 7
This court further added that section 96 "seemingly requires
that beneficiaries of land trusts be natural persons," 28 and inter-
preted the word "person" in this statute as excluding corporations.
In doing so, the court seemingly failed to give effect to the specific
provision of Section 37 of the General Construction Law which in-
cludes a corporation in the term "person."
In light of the fact, however, that a more particular con-
struction of a word in other statutes or cases will often supersede the
more general definition of a word in the General Construction Law,
and in light of the fact that a corporation has been considered to
be not a person in several other areas, 29 and for other purposes,
Surrogate Frankenthaler's position, although overruled by the in-
stant case, was a tenable one. It is also highly likely in the Norton
and DeForest cases that the courts were concerned primarily with
violations of the rule against perpetuities and the rule against in-
definite beneficiaries in a trust, and only secondarily with the precise
problem under discussion.30
The Supreme Court's construction, in the principal case, of
the pertinent statutes mentioned above, however, seems more logical,
more consistent with corporation law, and more consonant with
modern business practices. As emphasized by Justice Streit, there
is no valid reason today why a business corporation cannot be the
25 7 Misc. 2d 342, 343, 155 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Section 37 "is applicable to every statute unless its general object, or
the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that
a different meaning or application was intended ... " N.Y. GEN. CoNsm.
LAw § 110.
30 It must be remembered, however, that trusts of realty with business
corporations as beneficiaries, are still subject to rules governing ordinary trusts
of realty, including the rule against perpetuities and the prohibitions against
indefinite beneficiaries.
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beneficiary of a real property trust.3 ' As a matter of fact, the
proposition would seem to flow rather naturally from the ap-
plicable statutes, and has had, in all probability, a practical, if not
a legal existence for some time in this state.3 2 As well as being
entirely consistent with modern business activity and corporation law
trends, the decision in the instant case is in accord with most
scholarly authorities.3 3 Moreover, it would seem that ability to be
a benficiary may be implied from the power to hold and acquire
property, and need not be specifically granted by the corporate
charter.3 4
X
CRIMINAL LAW - WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL - RIGHT TO WAIVE
HELD QUALIFIED.- Defendant and codefendant were indicted on
two counts of first degree manslaughter, second degree manslaughter,
and conspiracy. The defendant was convicted on two counts of
second degree manslaughter and conspiracy. He appealed from this
conviction, claiming that the denial of his motion for a nonjury
trial was a violation of his absolute right under the New York
Constitution-' to waive a jury trial. In an opinion subsequently
s1 Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 682 207 N.Y.S.2d 137, 142
(Sup. Ct. 1960).32 Indeed, this is the theory which is implicit throughout Justice Streit's
discussion of the previous case law, as he indicates that the prior cases were
primarily concerned with violations of the rule against perpetuities, mis-
interpretation of § 96(3), and indefiniteness of beneficiaries. Id. at 680-84, 207
N.Y.S.2d at 140-43.
33 "[In the absence of statutes otherwise providing, a corporation can take
and hold the title to land as well as to personal property, and can be the
beneficiary of a trust either of land or of personalty." 2 SCOT, TRUSTS 819
(2d ed. 1956). IA BoGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 168, at 118 (1951).
RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 116, comment c (1959): "A corporation,
municipal or private, may be the beneficiary of a trust of property if it has
capacity to take and hold the legal title to such property."
34 See Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 47 Misc. 187, 194,94 N.Y. Supp.
65, 70 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 109 App. Div. 252, 96 N.Y. Supp. 10 (2d Dep't
1905: "[A]II applicable provisions of a general law under which a corpor-
ation has been formed, not expressly set forth in its certificate or articles of
incorporation, are to be read into, and taken to be a part of its charter .... "
Ibid. Consequently, since the New York corporation laws authorize a cor-
poration to hold choses in action, it would seem superfluous to include such
a power in the corporate charter. BALLANTINE, CoRLoiiATioNs § 18, at 62
(rev. ed. 1946).
I N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 2. "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in
the manner to be prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however,
[ VOL. 35
